Practice in Justice\u27s Court Joining or Splitting Causes of Action by H., G. D.
Volume 32 Issue 3 Article 10 
April 1926 
Practice in Justice's Court Joining or Splitting Causes of Action 
G. D. H. 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons 
Recommended Citation 
G. D. H., Practice in Justice's Court Joining or Splitting Causes of Action, 32 W. Va. L. Rev. (1926). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol32/iss3/10 
This Student Notes and Recent Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The 
Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized 
editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
payment. Needless to say, the requirement of such action
from the purchaser is utterly impracticable. It is also
submitted that the relief afforded a subsequent purchaser
by the Virginia statute is not as desirable as that given in
the Mitchell Case, since, in Virginia, the subsequent pur-
chaser upon learning of the prior unrecorded conveyance
merely receives a lien in equity on the property purchased,
for so much of his purchase money paid before he received
notice, but the Mitchell Case lets him keep his bargain and
only makes him responsible to the owner of the prior
unrecorded conveyance for the amount of the purchase
price still due. The Supreme Court of West Virginia
could then, no doubt, by a reaffirmance of the doctrine of
"complete purchaser" as laid down in the Mitchell Case, go
even farther in protecting a subsequent purchaser, who
has paid only part of the purchase price, then he receives
under the Virginia statute. In thus tempering the common
law doctrine the Court could reach a more desirable end
than that afforded in Virginia and, a fortiori, more desir-
able than the doctrine as laid down in the recent United
Fuel Gas Co. Case.
-H. R. A.
PRACTICE IN JUSTICE'S COURT JOINING OR SPLITTING CAUSES
OF ACTION.-The plaintiff brought two actions against the
defendant, before a justice of the peace, for $498.50,
in the aggregate, the purchase price of flour. In the
first action, the plaintiff recovered $276.00, for flour
sold and delivered from January 2 to January 18, 1924, on
bills payable February 1, 1924. To the plaintiff's second
action, on bills due December 1, 1923, and January 1, 1924,
for flour sold and delivered during November and Decem-
ber, 1923, and also on bills for sales and deliveries on
January 19 and 21, 1924, the defendant pleaded part of §48
c. 50, W. VA. CODE, quoted below, as a special plea in
bar. Judgment was given for the plaintiff, and was affirm-
ed on appeal to the circuit court. The defendant brought
error. Held, judgment affirmed. Clay v. Meadows, 130
S. E. 656 (W. Va. 1925).
This case seems to have been decided upon the doctrine
of stare decisis; for it is admitted, in the opinion, that
"individual members of the court entertain the view that
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the decisions in the McClaugherty and Wood Cases, [infra,]
construing the statute, are not consonant with correct
principle; but feel that, inasmuch as these rulings have
been accepted as the law, less harm will be done by
approving than disapproving them." It is submitted that
the decision puts a strained construction on the statute,
which provides that "when the plaintiff has several de-
mands against the same defendant founded on contract,
express or implied, he must bring his action for the whole
amount due and payable at the time such action is brought,
whether the demands be such as might have been hereto-
fore joined In the same action or not." W. VA. CODE,
c. 50, §48. The court reaffirmed the holding in Grocery
Company v. McClaugherty, 46 W. Va. 419, 33 S. E. 252,
which adjudged, in effect, that the statute means what it
says only when the aggregate of the several demands does
not exceed the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. It
would seem that this interpretation of the statute is incon-
sistent with the legislative intent, which, it may be taken,
was to minimize contentious and protracted litigation by
compelling the parties thereto to submit all their existing
disputes, arising out of contract, to adjudication in one
proceeding, if recourse be had to the justice's court, which
admittedly is the forum of most petty legal contentiousness.
The Court, in the present holding, goes far beyond the deci-
sions in the two earlier West Virginia cases, which are
relied upon as authorities. Grocery Company v. McClaugh-
erty, 46 W. Va. 419, 33 S. E. 252; Bank v. Wood, 60 W.
Va. 617, 55 S. E. 753. They were both suits brought on
promissory notes, and unquestionably such notes consti-
tute separate causes of action, especially where, as in the
Grocery Company Case, for example, the second note is
given subsequently to the first, with a later date of matur-
ity, and for an indebtedness not yet incurred at the time of
execution of the first instrument. Staane v. Mutual Loan,
etc., Co., 102 Ga. 597, 29 S. E. 452; Nathan v. Hope, 77
N. Y. 420; Presstman v. Beach, 61 Md. 203; See also 1 C. J.
1115. In the present case, there was no question of a note
or notes, but merely a claim for successive deliveries, and
the bills for all of which were due and payable at, or be-
fore, the time of bringing the first action. Nevertheless,
the Court considers these bills for flour maturing at
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different times, it is true as constituting several distinct
causes of action. But after the maturity of the various
bills, why should they be not treated as mere parts of one
cause of action, in the same manner as the several
items of the "running", or continuous, or book, account
of a merchant, or a physician, or an apothecary?
Markham v. Middleton, 2 Str. 1259, cited in Stevens v.
Lockwood, 13 Wendell (N. Y.) 644, 28 Am. Dec. 492.
Judge Cooley has said that, if two or more bills, payable
on different dates, form one cause of action after maturity,
they are again divided, when each separately is barred by
the statute of limitations. Stickel v. Steel, 41 Mich. 350,
1 N. W. 1046. But is that fact decisive as to the problem
under consideration? The family physician's charges, for
instance, are regarded as a "running" account, giving rise
to a single cause of action, though the individual items may
be for medical attendance upon more than one member of
the household, and though often as extensive a period as
six months, a year, or longer, intervenes between his min-
istrations; and yet each item of the physician's bill is sep-
arately barred by the statute of limitations. 1 R. C. L. "Ac-
tions", §34, at page 358, citing Oliver v. Holt, 11 Ala. 574,
46 Am. Dec. 228, and Stevens v. Lockwood, supra. There is
a conflict of authority as to whether the doctor's claims give
him more than one cause of action. Potter v. Harvey, 34
R. I. 71, 82 Atl. 812. But by the numerical weight of
authority, he has but a single cause of action. 1 C. J. 1113;
1 R. C. L. 358, notes 9 and 11. The compensation for the
physician's services, it is true, is usually due at once, while,
in this case, the flour was sold on credit; but nevertheless,
the physician's remuneration, in consequence of his skill
being invoked intermittently, becomes payable on different
dates, and the separable items are barred separately; and
so, likewise, it is in the case of flour, sold at intervals, on
terms of credit accruing on different dates. It is submitted
that no distinction, in this respect, should be made between
the flour claim and the "running" account of the merchant,
doctor, etc. Although it seems that the decision is "not
consonant with correct principle", nevertheless, there is
much to be said in its favor. The case represents the
accepted law, and is merely a quite broad extension of the
rule of construction laid down in the earlier cases in this
3
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jurisdiction, and which perhaps it would be unwise to
disturb. Apparently, the case is in accord with the numeri-
cal weight of authority in other jurisdictions, and it has the
support of one, at least, of the ablest jurists that the United
States has produced. Cooley, J., in Stickel v. Steel, supra.
Another argument in favor of the existing rule, presented
by the Court in the Grocery Company Case, is that the law
requires nothing unreasonable; yet, if the plaintiff brings
his action before a justice of the peace, and is required to
include all his demands, and if they are in excess of the
jurisdictional 'limits of the justice as to amount, then the
law makes the plaintiff do the legally impossible, or else
forfeit all his demands exceeding in the aggregate $300.00.
It may be contended, also, that the effect of the literal en-
forcement of the statute would be to drive the plaintiff
into the circuit court, where the rules of the common law
govern, and there he would not be required to join all his
claims in one action, but might institute as many proceed-
ings as he has causes of action. However, it is submitted
that a sufficient answer to this contention is found in the
consideration of what may be reasonably taken as the
intention of the legislature; namely, to reduce litigation to
a minimum, and as the lawmaking body doubtless was fully
cognizant of the fact that parties are most litigious in the
justice's court, it doubtless was seeking to limit suitors to
one action in that forum. If the legislature intended an
exception to be made in cases where the aggregate of the
plaintiff's claims exceeded the jurisdiction limits of the
court, it is not unreasonable, it is suggested, to think that
the statute would have so provided specifically. It is
true that at common law the plaintiff was not required to
bring in all his demands, and that it is not necessary for
him so to do, in the circuit court; yet, if he does seek his
relief in the circuit court, it is quite natural that he should
unite all his claims against the same defendant in one
action. In conclusion, it may be added that the fact that
the remedy before a Justice of the peace is more speedy
and less expensive than in a court of general jurisdiction
scarcely warrants the construction that has been put upon
the statute. -G. D. H,
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